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Abstract 
 
We investigate the performance of call markets at the open and close using a unique 
natural experiment provided by the London Stock Exchange where traders can choose 
between a call and an "off-exchange" dealership system. Although the call market 
dominates dealers in terms of price discovery, it suffers from a high failure rate to open 
and close trading especially when trading conditions are difficult. The call's trading costs 
increase with (a) greater asymmetric information, (b) slow trading, (c) unbalanced order 
flow, and (d) greater uncertainty. Traders' resort to call auctions is negatively correlated 
with firm size, implying that the call may not be the optimal method for opening and 
closing trading of medium and small sized stocks. 
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I Introduction
The open and close of markets have enormous significance for traders and regula-
tors. The open assimilates information gathered overnight, and performs impor-
tant information aggregation and price discovery functions while the closing price
serves as a benchmark for an array of interested parties, particularly at critical
calendar dates. Much of the received thinking emphasizes the virtues of a call
auction in opening and closing markets to produce eﬃcient prices. Most Euro-
pean markets have call auctions both at the open and close (Paris, Frankfurt,
London) while the New York Stock Exchange has a stabilized auction market at
the open. Recently there has been pressure on Nasdaq, from the SEC and market
participants, to adopt a call mechanism (Ewing, 2000). Nasdaq set up a special
committee to consider the issues, and has decided that a pure call auction was
not the best mechanism. Instead it has introduced the Nasdaq Oﬃcial Closing
Price (NOCP) in 2003 and a similar Nasdaq Oﬃcial Opening Price (NOOP) in
April 2004, both of which incorporate a limited call auction element into the
dealer quotes system.
The literature studying opening mechanisms has focused exclusively on the
price discovery issue of single mechanisms operating alone. Biais, Hillion and
Spatt (1999) and Cao, Ghysels and Hatheway (2000) analyze the pre-opening on
the Paris Bourse (opens through an automated call) and Nasdaq (which before
opened exclusively through market makers’ quotes) respectively, and find that
price discovery occurs as participants learn from indicative prices. Madhavan and
Panchapagesan (2000) show that specialists using a stabilized auction mechanism
at the open on the NYSE, set more eﬃcient prices than would an auction with
public orders and in this way facilitates price discovery. Bacidore and Lipson
(2001) use stocks that moved from Nasdaq to NYSE to investigate the eﬀects
of opening and closing procedures used by the NYSE and Nasdaq. They find
that the specialist-managed opening auction on the NYSE reduces trading costs,
but only limited evidence that the closing call produces benefits. Pagano and
Schwartz (2003) show that the introduction of a closing call on the Paris Bourse
has improved market quality resulting in lower transaction costs for traders and
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better price discovery.
This paper diﬀers from the existing literature in that it analyzes the perfor-
mance along diﬀerent trading dimensions of two diﬀerent trading systems - the
call mechanism versus the dealership mechanism - competing together for order
flow during market open and close. We address the following questions: What
factors determine the desirability of call auctions and dealership markets at such
important trading periods? How sensitive are call auctions to trading conditions
and the presence of informed traders? Under which conditions does such a mech-
anism promote the most eﬃcient price discovery process? Our investigation is
made possible by the unique natural experiment aﬀorded by the institutional
structure of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) where the main order-driven
trading mechanism (SETS) operates alongside a parallel “oﬀ-exchange” dealer
system. The opening and closing trades on SETS are determined by a call auc-
tion1, while the dealer system relies on market makers’ quotes. In such a set-up
traders have a choice where to trade at the open and close.
The competitive structure on the LSE is similar to that on Nasdaq after
the introduction of the NOCP and NOOP, since on both exchanges stocks can
open and close through diﬀerent trading systems. The choice oﬀered to LSE
traders on where to execute their orders, provides a natural experiment on the
relative advantages of these two systems. Furthermore, in contrast to NYSE
specialists, London dealers’ participation is entirely voluntary since they do not
have any price continuity obligations and no obligations to quote prices at all.
Most importantly, we can document how the costs and benefits of the two systems
depend on the overall trading environment, and thereby determine the desirability
of call auctions over dealership markets.
Nasdaq’s caution in adopting call mechanisms at the open and close seems to
be at odds with existing literature that emphasizes the importance of asymmetry
of information among traders. For example, in comparing dealership and auction
markets, Madhavan (1992) shows that a periodic call auction is robust to the
problems of asymmetric information. Economides and Schwartz (1995) propose
1The opening call has been in place since October 1997, while the closing call was introduced
in May 2000.
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the call auction at the open as the ideal solution to the problem of assimilating
diverse information from traders to achieve informational eﬃciency of prices, and
thereby minimize adverse selection problems where some traders have superior
information to others. Domowitz and Madhavan (2001) argue that the most
important benefits of an opening call “are, in theory, most valuable for thinly
traded assets where public information is poor and hence adverse selection is a
serious problem” (Domowitz and Madhavan (2001), p. 18).
On the other hand, there is evidence that a call mechanism may suﬀer because
liquidity is often latent, especially at crucial times such as open and close. For
example, Angel and Wu (2001) examine a simulated call auction on Nasdaq and
conclude that “A centralized call may performworse than the existing opening [on
Nasdaq] for several reasons. First, real order flow suﬀers from “air pockets” that
leads to order imbalances...Second, the transparency of a mechanical call may
deter many investors who do not want their trading interest widely displayed.
Third, much liquidity provision is conditional and not easily captured by the
current generation of centralized call facilities.” (Angel and Wu (2001), p.3)
If all the liquidity in the market came to the call auction, then the price will
be close to the eﬃcient market price. However the call auction could be attracting
only the tip of the liquidity iceberg, and the rules of a call can make this worse -
everybody wants everybody else to reveal their orders without revealing anything
themselves. This argument is closely related to the ideas behind the coordination
motives for trade. The idea is that a trader’s decision to submit an order depends
on the likelihood that her order will be executed, but this in turn depends on
how many other traders on the other side of the market have decided to submit
orders. Buyers will be more likely to enter a market if they believe that there
are many sellers, and conversely, sellers are more likely to enter a market if
they believe that there are many buyers. Diamond (1982) terms these spillover
eﬀects “thick market externalities”, in which the gains from trade depend on the
number of other traders who decide to come to the market. The more traders
are expected in the market, the greater is the expected ease of transaction, and
hence the bigger is the expected gain from participating in trading activity. In
Pagano (1989), depth and liquidity depend on the conjectures that traders make
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about the trading decisions of others. Higher participation encourages further
participation, thereby amplifying the gains.
Thick market externalities have a self-fulfilling element: the more traders
believe that the market will be active, the more they will be willing to partici-
pate, which brings about the more active markets that they hypothesized in the
first place. Given the decentralized nature of trading decisions on the call, thick
market externalities are stronger for the call mechanism than for the dealership
market. The potential gains from trading in the call market are more sensitive
to the degree of participation from other traders, as compared to the dealership
market where an intermediary is always available to execute an order. Price un-
certainty may reinforce any reluctance to trade in a call auction, which then has
the potential to become self-fulfilling. Dealers can short-circuit the vicious circle
of price volatility and lack of liquidity, leading to more price volatility.
We first analyze the issue of price discovery at the open and close and find
that for most stocks the open (and close) call has better price discovery properties
than the opening (and closing) dealers’ quotes. We then develop an endogenous
switching regression model to investigate the choice made by individual traders
where to trade at the open and close. Bymodelling the microeconomics of traders’
decisions, we are able to identify the factors that influence the choice of market
and to quantify the benefits of immediacy oﬀered by the dealership market at
the open and close. We find that trading costs on the call market increase with
price uncertainty, adverse selection and order flow imbalance while they decrease
with high expected volume and for small and medium sized orders. The results
indicate that traders are sometimes willing to pay higher costs on the dealership
system, especially at the open, rather than migrating to the call where no spread
is paid.
Our results, while most relevant to the issue of mechanism design at the mar-
ket’s open and close, are also related to another strand of the literature that an-
alyzes interactions between dealers and the order book in hybrid markets, specif-
ically the LSE (see, for instance, Cai and Dufour (2003), Ellul (2001) Friederich
and Payne (2002), and Jain, Jiang, McInish and Taechpiroontong (2004)). The
traders’ choice model used in this paper can also be related to an earlier liter-
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ature that focused on the choice between dealers and order book trading in the
form of interdealer brokers (see Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan (1998), Reiss
and Werner (1998 and 2004)).
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the institutional details
of the market open and close on the LSE and explains the data used in our study.
Section III provides the first look at the actual usage of the call and dealership
system at the open and call and investigates the price discovery issue. Section
IV develops an endogenous switching regression model to investigate the traders’
decision on where to trade at the open and close. Section V concludes.
II Institutional Design and Data
Following a lengthy period of pressure from market participants and regulators,
in October 1997 the LSE introduced SETS, an order-driven trading system, as
the oﬃcial trading system for its most liquid FTSE100 constituent securities. The
previous quote-driven dealer system was allowed to continue in parallel with the
oﬃcial SETS system, with dealers voluntarily quoting prices over the telephone
and trading oﬀ-exchange. The LSE also changed the way in which the market
opens: a call auction replaced the dealers’ quotes that were submitted at the
beginning of each day’s Mandatory Quote Period. On 30 May 2000, the LSE
introduced a call auction at the close.
Features of the opening call auction algorithm have evolved since its introduc-
tion. Originally only limit orders were allowed during the 10 minute pre-opening
period, immediately before the oﬃcial opening of the market. During the pre-
open orders may be cancelled and the LSE disseminates the best bid and ask
quotes submitted, if there are any.2 At the end of this pre-opening period the
order book is frozen, and provided that the order book has crossing orders, an
algorithm runs which crosses the orders present on the two sides of the market.
Before May 2000 this algorithm calculated the price at which the maximum vol-
2Up until May 2000 the LSE did not calculate or disseminate the “indicative price” (the
price at which the call crosses, conditional on all the orders submitted to the system), though
some data vendors’ information systems were able to disseminate the call’s indicative price
because the algorithm used by LSE allowed such vendors to use the orders in the system to
calculate such a price.
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ume of shares in each security can be traded, and in cases where there were two
or more prices which satisfied this criterion, the average price was used. The
call’s price determination algorithm runs through each security in turn, with a
random process in terms of the securities’ sorting. The matching algorithm was
originally thought to take two to three minutes to run through all SETS stocks.
In practice, however, matching never hits the ceiling of this time configuration.
In fact, the data at our disposal shows that the call algorithm rarely takes more
than 30 seconds to execute.3 No trading in any SETS security can take place
while the algorithm runs. When the matching exercise is finished, trading moves
into the continuous trading mode. Any remaining unexecuted orders are left on
the book for execution during the normal trading period. Once the uncrossing
process for each security is complete, continuous automated execution in that
security begins and orders can be entered and deleted as before.
The opening mechanism has undergone a number of structural changes since it
was introduced in 1997 to “make the process more eﬃcient and aim to encourage
more widespread use of auctions in SETS” (Market Enhancements: Guide to
Release 3.1, November 2000). There have been three alterations to the oﬃcial
opening time. From SETS’s introduction until 20 July 1998, the opening time
was 8:30 a.m. Between 20 July 1998 to 20 September 1999 it was changed to
9:00 a.m., and since then the market’s opening has been 8:00 a.m. In addition
on 30 May 2000, the LSE introduced a series of measures to make the opening
call more attractive. These were (a) the ability to submit market orders, besides
limit orders, (b) the calculation and dissemination of the indicative call price; (c)
a more eﬃcient and faster matching in the call algorithm; and (d) the introduction
of a random end to the call.
The price at which execution takes place in the trading environment since
May 2000 is based on the following rules: (a) maximum volume transacted; (b)
if more than one price with equal value for (a) is obtained, the minimum order
surplus is used; (c) if more than one price with equal values for (a) and (b) is
3It is possible that the random end will be after the 30 seconds due to either (i) price
monitoring, that occurs when the potential call price hits the configurable price limits set by
the LSE, or (ii) market order extensions, that have been introduced to maximize the probability
of execution taking place during the call.
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obtained, the market pressure rule is used; and (d) if more than one price with
equal values for (a)-(c) is obtained, a reference price (usually the last automatic
trade price) is used.
Market orders submitted in the pre-opening take price and time priority over
limit orders. The pre-opening phase takes place over the ten minutes before the
oﬃcial open.
The closing call auction was introduced on 30 May 2000, as part of a broader
reform package. Continuous trading on SETS comes to an end at 4:30 p.m. Then,
in the five minute interval up to 4:35 p.m., both limit orders and market orders
are accepted for the closing call. When a market clearing price exists after this
period, the closing call algorithm runs to clear the market. The algorithm and
price-setting rules for the closing call are identical to the opening call. If the
closing call does not generate a price, then the settlement price for a stock at the
end of the day is calculated from the last ten minutes of continuous trading.
Orders can be submitted to the call auction by (a) individual investors (retail
or institutional) directly to the call auction or the dealership system; or (b) by
LSE member-firms either (i) on behalf of retail/institutional investors, or (ii) for
their own account. Up until 1 April 2001, there were no charges for order entry
or deletion on the call market. Charges were only levied for trades executed.
For the opening and closing call auctions trades the charge is split between both
participants. From 1 April 2001 the LSE has introduced a charge (1 pence) for
order entry and deletion.
In addition to SETS, trading may also take place “oﬀ-exchange”, through a
dealership system. Dealers provide liquidity oﬀ-exchange and act as voluntary
market makers in contrast to their obligations as market makers prior to October
1997. These dealers, as LSE members, must report non-order book trades within
three minutes of execution.
A Data
Our dataset consists of securities with access to both the SETS system and the
oﬀ-exchange dealer facility. In May 2000 when the closing call auction was intro-
duced, there were 175 securities registered on SETS and all were constituents of
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either the FTSE 100 or FTSE 250 indices. The transactions, quotes and order
book data was provided by the LSE’s “Transaction Data Service”. The data set
covers the period from June 1998 to December 2000 and contains (a) trades data
(for all trades taking place on the order book and the dealership system) to the
nearest second, (b) quotes data containing the best ask and best bid prices on the
order book, and (c) order history data of all orders submitted to the order book.
The order history data contains the date and time when the order is submitted,
the order type, quantity of shares and also prices. We merge the trade dataset
and the order history dataset to build the entire order book for each trading day
using an algorithm that takes into consideration the date and time of the order’s
submission, execution or cancellation. Trades data from SETS (with a symbol
“AT”) contains the transaction date, transaction time (to the nearest second),
the trade price, trade size and trade direction. In addition, there is also a code
for the trade counterparties. The LSE gives each counterparty a code for each
particular security for each month with codes changing every month. However,
there is no information as to the final identity of the counterparty. From May
2000, orders executed in the call phase are signed as “UT” to diﬀerentiate them
from those taking place in the continuous trading mode. Before 30 May 2000,
call-executed trades were time-stamped at exactly 9:00 a.m. or 8:00 a.m. de-
pending on the time when the call took place. From 30 May 2000, call-executed
trades are time stamped at the exact time when they are executed. All trades in
this period are found to have been transacted within 30 seconds from the open.
Trades data from the dealership system contains similar information and trades
are time-stamped to the nearest second.
[Table 1 here]
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics on the securities used in our analy-
sis. Panel A reports statistics on the FTSE 100 securities used for the open
analysis over the period 1 June 1998 to 31 December 2000. The securities are
split into five quintiles based on market capitalization with the top quintile in-
cluding the largest companies with an average market capitalization of 28,860
million GBP as at December 31 1999. The bottom quintile includes the smallest
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companies in the FTSE 100 index with an average market capitalization of 2,112
million GBP. Note that the capitalizations of the stocks in the bottom quintile are
still rather large in absolute terms. The Volume column reports the total daily
value of trading transacted on the order book or the dealer market (averaged over
days and securities in that quintile). The average daily trading value by stock on
SETS for the top quintile is 55.9 million GBP, and on the dealer system is 69.5
million GBP. The First Trade column reports the average value of the first trade
of the day on the call market and the dealer system. Panel A of Table 1 suggests
that the dealership market is used more than the order book during the day and
at the open and close. Furthermore, the first trade of the day is typically larger
on the dealer system.
Panel B of Table 1 reports the same information for the securities used for the
market close analysis. The dataset includes a wider set of securities (FTSE 100
and some of the FTSE 250 securities), with a larger presence of smaller stocks and
over a shorter period, i.e. from 30 May 2000 to 31 December 2000. Examining
Volume, Last Trade and Trades columns in Panel B we can see the same patterns
observed in Panel A.
III Usage of the Call and Dealership
We initially examine diﬀerences between the call and dealer system at the open
and close by comparing usage of the two systems in terms of the number of
trades taking place across the two systems. We define success or failure of the
call and dealership systems based on whether a trade is executed in each system.
If the first (last) trade of the day occurs in the call phase we say that the call
functions at the open (close) for that stock on that day. The call is defined as
not functioning when the book is empty or it contains orders but the algorithm
fails to match buyers and sellers. We define success on the dealership system
similarly, and we say that the dealership system functions at the open (close) if
there is a least one trade on the dealership mechanism in the time interval from
10 minutes before the oﬃcial opening and the subsequent 30 seconds after the
oﬃcial opening (a trade between 4:30 p.m. and 4:37 p.m.). We recognize that
9
a voluntary dealer may be willing to accept an order at any time and that her
quotes show a willingness to trade. However, we use a much stricter definition
of success and failure where dealers’ quotes have to be competitive enough to
generate a trade for the system to be successful. Likewise, we define a call’s
outcome as successful only if orders cross, rather than the mere fact that orders
are placed on the call.
We can then identify four diﬀerent states at the open and at the close for each
stock on each day: (a) State 1 where neither system functions {no trade on call
and no trade on dealership}, (b) State 2 where only the call functions {trade on
call and no trade on dealership}, (c) State 3 where only the dealership system
functions {no trade on call and trade on dealership} and (d) State 4 where both
systems function {trade on call and trade on dealership}. Table 2 reports the
distribution of the diﬀerent States at the open and close for by size quintile. The
units are stock-days - the number of times that any stock in the relevant size
category traded at the open and close. Note that there are far fewer observations
for the close, since the closing call auction has operated only since 30 May 2000.
[Table 2 here]
An initial conjecture is that the decision to trade on one system rather than
the other, is an independently distributed random variable. However the chi-
squared statistic on the independence of elements in these tables is easily rejected
implying that there is a strong pattern in the joint mode of opening and closing
the market. This behavior needs to be explained. In addition, the independence
of the elements in each row of the tables is also rejected. One important finding
in panel A of Table 2 is that the probability of both types of trading mechanism
functioning at the open is relatively rare: if the market opens at all, it tends
to be either the dealer market or the call auction that executes, not both. In
contrast, panel B of Table 2 shows that the probability of both types of trading
mechanisms functioning at the close is high. Summary statistics on the modes of
opening and closure are presented in Exhibits 1 and 2 below. First, consider the
probability of each mode of opening (call only, dealer only, and both) conditional
on there being an opening on at least one system (shown in Exhibit 1 derived
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from panel A of Table 2).
Exhibit 1:Probabilities Conditional on an Opening Trade
Market Cap Call Only Dealer Only Both
Top 20% 0.36 0.49 0.15
Next 20% 0.24 0.64 0.12
Next 20% 0.17 0.72 0.10
Next 20% 0.15 0.76 0.09
Bottom 20% 0.11 0.82 0.07
The most striking feature evident from Exhibit 1 is that the use of the dealer
market decreases as firm size increases while the call functions more as firm
size increases. As we move down the category of stocks classified by market
capitalization, the probability that the opening happens only on the dealer market
increases from 49% for the largest stocks to 82% for the smallest stocks. The
probability that an opening occurs in the call auction only falls from 36% for
the largest quintile to 11% for the smallest quintile of stocks. At the same time,
the probability that there is an open on both markets declines from 15% for the
largest stocks to just 7% for the smallest stocks.
A similar pattern is evident for the probabilities conditional on a closing trade,
as reproduced in Exhibit 2 (derived from panel B of Table 2).
Exhibit 2: Probabilities Conditional on a Closing Trade
Market Cap Call Only Dealer Only Both
Top 20% 0.08 0.07 0.85
Next 20% 0.13 0.10 0.77
Next 20% 0.15 0.21 0.63
Next 20% 0.07 0.48 0.45
Bottom 20% 0.06 0.64 0.31
Exhibit 2 shows that the conditional probability of having exclusively the
dealer system closing the market increases from 7% for the largest stocks to
11
64% for the smallest stocks. On the other hand, the conditional probabilities
for closing exclusively on the call, and having a closing trading on both systems
decreases as the firm size decreases.
In summary our initial look at the data in Table 2 is that there is a higher
incidence of traders using the dealer market for smaller stocks at the open and
close. This is in spite of the fact that the standard asymmetric information market
microstructure theories would suggest that the call is appropriate mechanism for
opening a market, particularly for smaller stocks where asymmetric information
is likely to be more prevalent. The call’s market share shows that such mechanism
cannot be considered as universally better than a dealer market in opening and
closing trading.
A Price Discovery
Which system contributes most to price discovery process? Although the call
does not function very frequently at the open, does it produce better price dis-
covery than the dealership system? Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1999) analyze the
price discovery process during the pre-opening on the Paris Bourse (that opens
through an automated call) and find that the first part is characterized by noisy
indicative prices giving way to a second part where indicative prices signal infor-
mation showing that learning takes place. Cao, Ghysels and Hatheway (2000)
find similar results for the pre-opening on Nasdaq (which occurs through market
makers’ quotes). They find that the nonbinding quotes on Nasdaq contain trade
information and that price discovery does take place in the pre-open phase. Here
we want to address the price discovery performance of the call and the dealership
markets. We shall first investigate the absolute diﬀerences between call and deal-
ership prices at the open and at the close and benchmark prices. Following this,
we shall turn our attention to the weighted price contribution of each market
mechanism.
We measure the absolute deviations of call and dealership prices at the open
and close from a benchmark price that is assumed to fully reflect all available
trade information. Using the appropriate benchmark price is diﬃcult given the
fragmented nature of trading on the LSE. We choose to work with the volume-
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weighted price obtained from all trades on both SETS and the dealership system
during a specific interval. For the open, we determine the benchmark price from
all trades executed on the two systems between 8:45 a.m. and 9:15 a.m. Finding
the benchmark price for the close is a diﬃcult task since there is no continuous
trading after the close as there is after the open. This means that results could be
dependent on the benchmark price chosen. In order to minimize this problem, we
use two diﬀerent benchmark prices, each obtained from diﬀerent time periods and
with diﬀerent inputs. First, we calculate the volume-weighted price of all trades
executed on the dealership system between 4:37 p.m. and 4:45 p.m. Secondly, we
calculate the volume-weighted price obtained from all the firm orders submitted
to the subsequent opening call and all trades on the dealership system on the
following day between 7:50 a.m. and 7:59:59 a.m.
We use actual call and dealership prices from the open and call periods. For
each stock, we compare the open (close) call and dealership prices with the cor-
responding benchmark price.
[Table 3 here]
Table 3 shows that the call, both at the open and at the close, produces
the lowest absolute price deviation (in percentage) compared to the dealership
system. Since we want to analyze the performance of both the open and close
calls we use the period 30 May 2000 - 31 December 2000 when both these two
algorithms were functioning for the same set of securities. For example, for the
top market capitalization decile, the open call produces an absolute deviation
of 0.759% whereas the dealership system produces a deviation of 1.281%. This
holds true for the stocks in the top seven deciles. However, for the bottom
three deciles the mean absolute diﬀerences are either lower for the dealership
system or not statistically significant. This shows that, although the call auction
does not function very frequently at the open, when it does it produces better
price discovery than the dealership system but the quality of the price discovery
deteriorates as market capitalization decreases.
The evidence on the closing call is more mixed. For the top two deciles we
also find that the absolute deviation is lower for the closing call rather than the
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dealership system. However, two of the top five deciles (the third and fourth
deciles when we use the first definition of the benchmark price) produce call
deviations that are not statistically significantly diﬀerent than the dealership
deviations. On the other hand, we also find that two of the bottom five deciles
produce call deviations that are smaller than the deviations on the dealership.
The evidence presented here shows a diﬀerent outcome to the one found by
Angel and Wu (2001) from a simulated call auction using actual Nasdaq data.
While they found that the absolute deviations between prices at the open call
and benchmark prices were larger on the call compared to dealers’ quotes for all
firm sizes, we find the opposite. This means that on the LSE, in contrast to a
simulated Nasdaq call, prices on the call are more indicative of future trading
activity than dealers’ quotes.
We next turn our attention on how new information gets impounded in prices
during the pre-open, open, pre-close and close periods. To measure the extent
of price discovery in each period we use the weighted price contribution (WPC)
measure in line with Barclay and Warner (1993), Cao, Ghysels and Hatheway
(2000) and Barclay and Hendershott (2001). We divide the open in two periods:
(a) 7:50 a.m. - 7:55 a.m., and (b) 7:56 a.m. - 8:00:30 a.m. The close period is
defined as 4:30:01 p.m. - 4:37 p.m.
Following Barclay and Hendershott (2001) we measure the WPC for each
day and for the cross-section of the FTSE 100 stocks for both the open and close
analysis over the period 30 May - 31 December 2000. For each of the trading
days and for each of the trading periods j defined above, the WPC is calculated
as:
WPCj =
SX
s=1
"
|returns|PS
s=1 |returns|
#
×
·
returnj,s
returns
¸
where returnj,s is the return during period j for stock s and returns is the
close-to-close return for stock s. The first term is the weight factor for each
stock whereas the second term provides the contribution of each period to the
total close-to-close returns. The returns for each day are calculated using the
same volume-weighted average price from trades on both the order book and the
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dealership system. One should also note that while no trading occurs on the
order book after the closing call until the next day, the same does not apply for
the dealership system. In fact, some trades on the dealership are reported to have
taken place between 4:37 p.m. and the 7:50 a.m. on the next day.
[Table 4 here]
Table 4 reports the WPC for the diﬀerent trading periods for both the call
market (Panel A) and dealership system (Panel B). Given that the duration of
the trading period has changed three times over the period 1998 - 2000, and
given that we need one common period to investigate the WPC, we decided to
conduct our analysis for the FTSE 100 securities over the period 21 September
1999 - 31 December 2000 when the trading day opened at 8:00 a.m. and closed
at 4:30 p.m. It appears that the first part of the pre-open period (7:50 a.m. -
7:55 a.m.) does not produce any significant price discovery neither on the call
nor on the dealership market. On the call this happens largely because the order
book is generally empty at this stage. Significant price discovery takes place in
the second part of the pre-open period that starts from 7:55 a.m. and concludes
when the open call algorithm has run its course. In general, we find that for
most stocks the call’s contribution to the WPC on the order book is larger than
that of the closing (and opening) dealers’ quotes to the dealership’s WPC.4 The
interesting result is that the open call’s WPC is larger than the dealership for
three of the top five decile groups while the dealership’s WPC shows that more
information is impounded at the open for the bottom three decile groups. The
amount of information impounded in the prices at the close is, an average, double
that found for the open.
IV Choosing Between Call and DealershipMar-
kets
Up to now we have found that the call functions only infrequently at the open,
and that the dealership system is a more popular trading venue at the open. This
4A similar result for the the continuous trading phase was found by Cai and Dufour(2003).
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is puzzling since we have seen that the cost of trading in the dealership is higher
than the zero cost of using the call. We have also found evidence indicating that
the call mechanism, when it opens, has better price discovery properties. To
complete the analysis we need to understand how traders choose where to trade.
Understanding this issue is complicated by the fact that unobserved heterogeneity
can be driving the results we have obtained so far. For example, the previous
analysis indicates that the call is not very liquid at the open, especially for smaller
stocks. However, this result has to be put under scrutiny since we know that
traders self-select in terms of trading location and this depends in part on (a)
their unobserved heterogeneity, and (b) expected trading costs. This requires a
careful consideration of selection biases before presenting convincing evidence on
the performance of call and dealership markets.
A An Endogenous Switching Model
Traders will migrate to the trading system at the open and close that provides
best execution. We assume that traders want to minimize trading costs by solving
a discrete choice problem. Conditional on deciding to submit an order, a trader
has a two-way trading choice: (a) send the order to the call market, or (b) send
the order to the dealer market. The observed trading cost to trader i in market
s is:
ys,i = βsXs + θs,i + us,i (1)
where s is the market mechanism, and s can take on two values: either the
call market C, or the dealership system D. Xs is a vector of relevant explanatory
variables, and θs,i captures the unobserved heterogeneity of the individual trader.
One possible example is the level of trader’s impatience, measuring trader i’s
urgency to trade. A trader who has an urgent desire to trade will prefer to trade
in the dealer market, since there is some uncertainty that an order submitted to
the call market will be executed. We assume that this uncertainty generates a
cost for the impatient trader so that for the call market θC,i > 0, but for the
dealer market θD,i = 0. Another example would be the case of a trader who
wishes to trade in medium or large orders, instead of small sized orders. The
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main issue faced by this type of trader is the cost associated with the relatively
low depth on the call system. In this set-up, trader i chooses to trade in that
market with the lowest eﬀective trading cost, where the eﬀective trading cost to
trader i in market s is y∗s,i.
After specifying the trading costs in both systems we proceed to investigate
the trader’s behavior. We assume that a trader has some information set, Ψi,
that will be used by the trader decide where to submit her order. This calls for
an investigation of the diﬀerential costs of trading in one system rather than the
other. In our case, the diﬀerential trading cost,
_
νi ,is represented as:
_
νi = λ
0Λi +E [yC,i − yD,i | Ψi] (2)
where λ0 is a vector of constants and Λi represents variables influencing the
trading decision. Substituting each of the trading cost equation for the call market
and dealership market in (1) into (2) above, we get the decision criterion function
for trader i:
_
νi = λ
0Λi + (βC − βD)Xi +Ψi (3)
which in turn can be represented as:
_
νi = ω
0Ωi +Ψi (4)
where Ωi = (Λi, Xi) and ω is a vector of coeﬃcients. Assuming that νi is
then the market chosen by trader i, then νi takes the value of 1 in the case
that the trader chooses the dealership system and 0 in the case where the trader
chooses the call market. From a data point of view, we will observe a trade on
the dealership system if
_
νi > 0 and if
_
νi < 0 then the trader decides in favor of
the call market.
It might be argued that we can directly estimate the eﬀect of Xs,i on trading
costs from (1). However an OLS regression on each market would yield inconsis-
tent estimates because of selection biases. A trader’s unobserved heterogeneity
will influence the trading venue’s choice and the trading costs in that venue. This
will produce an estimation framework where the error term of the trading cost
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equation in (1) will be correlated with the trader’s criterion function in (3). From
the standard properties of the normal distribution, we know that the expected
trading costs conditional on observing a trade on the dealership market is
E
£
yD,i|
_
νi = 1
¤
= β0DXi + σD
"
φ
¡
ω0Ωi
¢
Φ (ω0Ωi)
#
(5)
and, similarly for observing a trade on the call market:
E
£
yC,i|_νi = 0
¤
= β0CXi + σC
"
−φ
¡
ω0Ωi
¢
(1− Φ (ω0Ωi))
#
(6)
where σD (σC) is the covariance between the disturbance terms θ and uD (uC),
φ
¡
ω0Ωi
¢
is the standard normal density function and Φ
¡
ω0Ωi
¢
is the cumulative
standard normal distribution.
Due to this bias we shall use the two-stage econometric procedure proposed by
Lee, Maddala, and Trost (1979). We will first estimate ω from actual realizations
of ν using a probit model which will generate the maximum likelihood estimates
of ω. These estimates will then be used in our second-stage estimation of the
trading cost equation for each market. The model for the expected trading costs
estimated in the second stage is as follows:
E [yi] = β
0
CXi +
³
β0D − β
0
C
´
XiΦ+ φi (σD − σC) (7)
Estimated probabilities
−
Φ = Φ
µ
−ω
0
Ωi
¶
and
−
φ = φ
µ
−ω
0
Ωi
¶
for each order at
the open and close, obtained from the first-stage probit model, will be used to
estimate equation (7).
Measuring trading costs correctly is rendered diﬃcult by the diﬀerent natures
of the call auction and the dealership system. The bid-ask spread is not a good
measure for our purpose. Although we can measure spreads on the dealership
system we cannot do so for the call auction because the call produces a single
price. Furthermore, we also want to capture dynamic trading costs in the sense
that traders, besides deciding where to trade at the open (and close), also have
to decide whether to trade at the open (or close) or wait for some time and trade
during the continuous trading phase. For example, if a trader wants to trade
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early on during the trading session, she can either submit an order at the open
(on the call or dealership system) or submit it soon after the continuous mode
starts. Likewise, a trader who wants to trade at the close has a similar decision
to take: either place an order at the closing phase (close call or dealership system
after 4:30 p.m.) or else place her order towards the end of the continuous trading
mode.
Our measure of trading costs is the absolute diﬀerence between (a) the price
of each firm order submitted to the call auction, or (b) the price of a trade on the
dealership system and a benchmark price. The benchmark price is assumed to be
the price that reflects all the relevant trading information. For the open we define
the benchmark price as the volume-weighted price of all trades executed half an
hour up to an hour after the start of continuous trading. So, for example, for
the period 21 September 1999 - 31 December 2000 we consider trades executed
between 8:30 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. For other periods, with diﬀerent trading day
duration we change the definition of the benchmark period accordingly. For the
close we define the benchmark price as the volume-weighted price of the last 30
minutes of continuous trading. The evidence provided by Biais et al. (1999)
shows that one problem with this definition of trading costs is that some of the
orders submitted to the call auction have noisy prices, particularly those that are
submitted towards the beginning of the period, and are subsequently cancelled
before the call auction crosses. In order to avoid this problem we only consider
those orders that are submitted in the pre-open (pre-close) and not cancelled.
Although these are firm orders, it does not mean that such orders will necessarily
get executed on the call market.
The variables used for the first-stage probit model for the open (close) peri-
ods are the following: (a) the logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization, (b)
the average eﬀective spread on the order book in the first (last) 15 minutes of
continuous trading, (c) the logarithm of the mean order size submitted to the call
or dealership market relative to the mean stock order size computed across both
markets, (d) close-to-open (open-to-close) market returns, and (e) close-to-open
(open-to-close) own returns.
We divide the explanatory variables Xs in (1) into three broad categories: (a)
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measures of the state of the order book before the call algorithm executes during
the pre-open or pre-close periods and when bids are submitted, (b) measures
that capture the state of the entire market, in particular with respect to trading
activity, and the degree of uncertainty; and (c) other control variables that pro-
vide information on investors’ intentions. Specifically, we estimate the following
model:
The following are the independent variables making up the first category:
(a) Time-weighted order flow imbalance during auction: This variable
is calculated for stock j for every minute on the pre-open (pre-close) period on
every day d in the following way
NBX
i=1
V Bi −
NSX
i=1
V Si
NBX
i=1
V Bi +
NSX
i=1
V Si
and weighted by the time (in seconds) elapsed from the beginning of the auction
divided by the total number of seconds employed by the auction. V Bi is the buy-
initiated volume submitted to the auction by trader i and V Si is the sell-initiated
volume submitted to the call auction. This variable measures the degree of order
asymmetry in the order book. The reason for the time weighting is that, since
traders can withdraw orders before the auction enters the execution phase, we
want to give more weight to the orders that are found on the book just before
the auction executes. These orders are more indicative of the true order flow
asymmetries because early orders can be withdrawn. Large imbalances imply
coordination problems, and the coordination hypothesis predicts that traders
will steer clear of the call auction whenever significant imbalances occur.
(b) Price revisions during auction: This variable measures the absolute
price revision that takes place from the start until the end of the call process.
The idea behind this variable is that when there are lots of bidders, the price gets
“trapped” between very narrow ranges. If there are few bidders, the price could
range more widely, capturing the law of large numbers as argued by Satterth-
waite (1994). We expect that higher price dispersion imply higher coordination
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problems, leading to a lower likelihood of the call functioning.
(c) Bid dispersions during auction: A decision faced by the bidders in the
opening and closing auctions is whether to split up their bids and by how much
to disperse their bids. Any buyer wants to get her order filled as much as possible
and this is especially true when the bidding behavior of the other participants
tend to suggest that the price is high. Conversely, if the participants’ bidding
behavior indicates a low price then the buyer would like to end up with the
smallest numbers of shares. Consistent with the findings in Nyborg, Rydqvist and
Sundaresan (2002), when uncertainty in the market is high we expect bidders to
increase their bid dispersions. This variable is measured as the standard deviation
of the volume-weighted bids in each auction. We measure both the Trader’s Bid
Dispersion which is the bid dispersion of the broker submitting an order to the
call, and the Market’s Bid Dispersion which is the overall bid dispersion in the call
market. According to the adverse selection hypothesis the call is more robust to
uncertainty in the presence of asymmetric information, and would predict that
traders choose the call when there is increased uncertainty in the market. In
contrast, the coordination theory would predict that with more uncertainty in
the market the less likely that the call will function.
The variables making up the second category are the following:
(a) Trading volume: If thick market externalities exist, then we expect that
the conditions generating such externalities will also induce investors to go to the
market. This means that the volume of transactions is expected to be high when
markets experience thick externalities. Hence, actual volume transacted will be a
proxy for these conditions generating thick externalities. We use the normalized
dollar-volume in the (a) first hour of continuous trading for the open call, and
(b) in the last hour of continuous trading for the closing call. However in the
presence of asymmetric information informed traders will also trade when the
market is most liquid, so that both adverse selection and coordination theories
would predict that the larger the trading volume, the greater the chance that
traders will go to the call auction. In order to distinguish between these theories
in the presence of an increase in trading volume we will need to examine the
adverse selection variable described below.
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(b) Variability: Ausubel (1997) shows how the “champion’s plague” could
occur in multi-unit auctions. One of the decisions facing traders at the open and
close auctions is how much to bid for. The “champion’s plague” in the presence of
reservation prices suggests that, when uncertainty is high, bidders will reduce the
number of shares they will bid for. Extending this argument to the call auction
we conjecture that when uncertainty is high bidders will prefer not to participate
at all in calls, preferring instead either the dealership market or not to trade. On
the other hand the adverse selection hypothesis (Madhavan, 1992) predicts that
an increase in uncertainty will cause traders to prefer the call since it is more
robust in such market conditions. We measure uncertainty by the normalized
standard deviation of returns in the first (last) half hour of continuous trading
for the open (close).
(c) Dealers’ inventory: The (voluntary) dealer’s inventory could have an
impact on the open and close of trading. Domowitz and Madhavan (2001) point
out that a potential disadvantage of the dealership system is that opening prices
in such a system might be biased because of a dealers’ inventory positions at
the start of trading. We expect that a dealer who has an unbalanced inventory
position at the end of the trading day will want to balance inventory at the first
possible opportunity, i.e. the open call. Likewise, a dealer that has experienced
shocks to his inventory during a given trading day will want to re-balance her
position towards the end of the trading day. Given that the closing call is the last
possible opportunity for inventory re-balancing in any given day, we expect that
the higher the inventory’s disequilibrium the more likely that a dealer will use the
closing call. We measure this variable in the following way: for each dealer we
compute the amount of buys and sells she does for each single day and compute
the imbalance at the end of continuous trade (for the close call) and after the
closing call (for the open call). For the open call we use the dealers’ inventory
position during the previous day (hence in the opening call auction on day T we
use the dealers’ inventory position on day T − 1). For the close call we use the
dealers’ inventory position during that day (hence closing call auction on day T
we use the dealers’ inventory position on day T ).
(d) Adverse selection costs: The market microstructure literature shows
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that investors react to the perceived presence of private information in the mar-
ket. We measure the level of asymmetric information by extracting the adverse
selection component of the actual bid-ask spread on the order book in the first
hour of continuous trading for the open call and in the last hour of continuous
trading for the closing call. Standard market microstructure models predict that
the call mechanism is robust to the presence of asymmetric information and hence
predict that traders will use the call mechanism more frequently when adverse
selection costs are high. Under the coordination theory traders facing this type
of uncertainty react by becoming very cautious in their bidding and it is likely
that traders withdraw from the trading process. We use the Lin et al. (1995)
methodology to measure the adverse selection component of the eﬀective spreads
in the first (last) half hour of continuous trading for the open (close).
In addition to the variables listed above, we also use order size of every
order submitted to the call market and the trade size on the dealership system
to capture the trader’s characteristics. Furthermore, since the call market suﬀers
from low depth, traders are aware that large orders can produce a significant
price impact on the call market whereas such concerns are less severe for orders
submitted to the dealership system. We also include the number of orders
submitted to the auction.
The control variables are the following:
(a) News dummy: We control for any significant news issued by firms.
Days following the issue of significant news (earnings announcement, dividend
announcement and mergers) take a value of 1 and 0 otherwise.
(b) Day-of-the week dummy variables: We also used a dummy variable
for each day of the week as a control for calendar eﬀects.
(c) Cross-listed firms: We also control for components of the FTSE 100
Index that are cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The overnight
period is shorter for these stocks and this could influence trading behavior.
B Results
Table 5 shows the results of the endogenous switching regression model for both
the open (Panel A) and the close (Panel B).
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[Table 5 here]
The coeﬃcient estimates for β1 − β9 represent the slope of the trading costs
on the call market; β10 represents the diﬀerence between the trading costs on
the dealership market and the call market; and β11−β19 represent the diﬀerence
in the slopes of the trading costs between the two markets. The results show
that (a) order imbalance (β1 > 0), (b) adverse selection costs (β6 > 0), (c) price
uncertainty (β7 > 0), and (d) order size (β8 > 0) increase the trading costs of
the call market, both at the open and at the close. On the other hand, the call’s
trading costs are lower when trading volume is high (β5 < 0). The results also
show that the dealership system suﬀers from higher fixed costs compared to the
call market (β10 > 0). Furthermore, the marginal trading costs in the dealership
market are lower than those on the call market when (a) order imbalance is high
(β11 < 0), (b) adverse selection costs are high (β16 < 0), (c) price uncertainty
is high (β17 < 0), and (d) order size is large (β18 < 0), whereas marginal costs
on the dealership are higher when trading volume is high (β15 > 0). Finally,
the statistical significance of β20 shows the presence of traders’ selection biases
between the two market systems. The R2 is low - 5.28% - but the F value is 280.26
and we can strongly reject the hypothesis that the independent variables used in
this model have no explanatory power of trading costs on the two markets.
Analyzed together, the results show that the dealership system generates lower
trading costs than the call market at low levels of trading volume but the result
flips when volume is high. For example, considering the open call (close call) we
find that decreasing trading volume with one standard deviation from its average
generates trading costs that are about 0.65% (0.25%) lower on the dealership
system; whereas increasing trading volume with one standard deviation makes
the call market cheaper by about 0.89% (0.14%) compared to the dealership
market.
On the other hand, small orders receive better execution (lower trading costs)
on the call market compared to the dealership system, whereas larger orders get
better execution on the dealership system.5 For example, considering the open
5Similar findings, but in a diﬀerent set-up, were found by Reiss and Werner (1996), and
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call (close call) we find that decreasing the average trade size by one standard
deviation from its average value makes the call market cheaper by about 0.62%
(0.13%) while increasing it by one standard deviation from its average volume
makes the dealership system less expensive by about 0.57% (0.14%) compared to
the call market.
When the presence of informed traders increases, trading costs on the call
market are higher than the dealership market. Furthermore, when price uncer-
tainty is high we also find higher trading costs on the call. In both cases, this will
make traders less likely to choose the call market. Such evidence goes against
the prediction of the asymmetric information models that conjecture that call
markets are better suited to deal with adverse selection and uncertainty issues
than the dealership system.
Our findings are supportive of the coordination motives rather than the the-
ories of asymmetric information For example according to the adverse selection
models, in so far as asymmetric information is likely to be more prevalent in
smaller stocks, we would expect the benefits of the call to be at their greatest,
and trades in these stocks are more likely to take place on the call auction. On
the other hand the rival coordination theory would suggest that since smaller
stocks have a relatively small shareholder base, it will be more diﬃcult to find a
counterparty to a potential trade. Thus, the coordination theory would predict
that it is stocks with the larger market capitalization that will transact on the
call auction .In fact we find that medium-sized and smaller stocks are more likely
to trade on the dealership, which is consistent with the coordination theory.
Another variable that allows us to distinguish between the two alternative the-
ories is the degree of uncertainty associated with the underlying security. Mad-
havan (1992) shows that as the variance of returns of the security increases it
is more likely that the dealership will fail to function, but that the call auction
remains robust to the increased uncertainty. So for days characterized by high
variability of returns, the asymmetric information theories predict that traders
will prefer to trade on the call system. In contrast, the coordination theory sug-
gests that increased uncertainty will deter traders from submitting orders to the
Bernhardt et al. (2004).
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call since it is less likely traders expect to find a match, preferring instead the
dealer market. Again we find that on days when the degree of uncertainty is
high traders migrate to the dealer market, consistent with the predictions of the
coordination theories.
Thick market externalities have a self-fulfilling element: the more traders
believe that the market will be active, the more they will be willing to participate,
which brings about the more active markets that they hypothesized in the first
place. The potential gains from trade in the call market is more sensitive to the
degree of traders’ participation, compared to the dealership market. If market
activity is expected to be high, then the coordination motive encourages traders
to place orders in the call market. Consistent with the coordination theories,
we find evidence showing that on days when the market is expected to be very
active, it is more likely that traders submit orders to the call market rather than
trade on the dealership market.
C Robustness
We check the robustness of the endogenous switching model in several ways. The
first robustness check deals with the definition of trades at the open and close
on the dealership system. It should be recalled that we define a trade at the
open (close) as one that takes place between 7:50 a.m. and 8:00:30 a.m. (4:30
p.m. and 4:37 p.m.). Due to possible slow reporting on behalf of the dealers
we could be biasing our results against the dealership system. Hence, we run
both the endogenous switching model taking into consideration - one at a time
- dealership trades up to (a) 8:01 a.m., (b) 8:02 a.m., and (c) 8:03 a.m. for the
open analysis, and dealership trades from 4:30 p.m. up to (a) 4:38 p.m., (b) 4:39
p.m., and (c) 4:40 p.m. for the close analysis. The results (not shown here) for
both the endogenous switching model and the multinomial logit are very similar
to the ones shown in Table 5.
Next, we test for possible asymmetries between buyer- and seller-initiated
orders and we reestimated the endogenous switching model for buy orders (buy
trades on the dealership) and sell orders (sell trades on the dealership) separately.
While the estimated coeﬃcients were diﬀerent than the ones reported in Table 5,
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the overall outcome is not diﬀerent than the one presented above.
We also checked for the endogeneity of normalized volume and returns volatil-
ity by using predicted volume and predicted volatility. The results obtained are
similar to those in Table 5. Finally, we run the endogenous switching model with
the square-root transform of the order size and we found no significant diﬀerences
from the results shown above.
V Conclusions
This paper has investigated the trading patterns at the opening and closing of
the London Stock Exchange where traders can choose between a call market and
a dealership system to place orders. Our initial results identified a puzzle in
the use of these two markets at the open and close of daily trading: although
no direct trading costs are incurred on the call and spreads are usually high on
the dealership market, we are more likely to see medium-sized and small stocks
opening and closing using dealers. Adding to this puzzle is the fact that when the
call does execute, price discovery is more eﬃcient on the call than the dealership.
So although the call auction is both cheaper and informationally more eﬃcient
that the dealership, traders still prefer to use the dealer market under certain
market conditions and for medium and small companies.
We examined traders’ decisions on the choice of trading venue. In the pres-
ence of uncertainty, traders shy away from the call and prefer to trade on the
dealership market. The call is popular on days with higher expected trading
volumes, and when adverse selection costs are low. Our findings are at odds
with the mainstream asymmetric information models, they are consistent with
coordination motives for trade.
The regulatory implications in terms of market design are notable. Stock
markets around the world have tended to converge on order driven systems as
the optimal trading mechanism. The call’s market share for our sample stocks
shows that such mechanism should not be considered as universally better than
a dealer market in opening and closing trading. Our results suggest that the
call’s perceived dominance is premature: although it is the case that the call
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market functions well for liquid stocks, our results suggest that in smaller stocks
with less liquidity, a dealership market with an intermediary continues to provide
valuable service. The same applies for the provision of liquidity in diﬃcult market
conditions when dealers - even though they have no mandatory requirements -
are more likely to provide liquidity than what can be found in call markets.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Securities used for the Opening Analysis
Market Cap Price Volume First Trade
Quintile Mean Median x1,000 x10
OB Dealer OB Dealer
Top 28,860 24,081 797 55,950 69,560 4,492 9,455
Next 7,596 6,895 593 15,680 24,280 3,386 3,111
Next 4,746 4,125 601 11,090 19,050 3,374 4,163
Next 3,136 2,985 568 5,381 9,740 2,653 3,794
Bottom 2,112 1,988 372 4,794 8,949 2,766 3,304
Panel B: securities used for the Closing Analysis
Quintile Market Cap Price Volume Last Trade
Mean Median x1,000 x10
OB Dealer OB Dealer
Top 21,951 15,022 887 35,810 47,030 9,541 66,066
Next 5,292 5,286 716 8,859 15,180 4,273 38,981
Next 2,839 2,739 603 5,109 9,614 3,808 28,940
Next 1,396 1,298 473 2,830 6,296 3,522 20,122
Bottom 468 447 305 1,010 2,827 1,918 8,744
The table reports descriptive statistics for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 companies used
for Opening and Closing analysis and trading on the Order Book (OB) and the Dealer
market simultaneously. Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the FTSE 100 stocks
employed for the Opening Call during the period 1 June 1998 - 31 December 2000.
Panel B shows descriptive statistics for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 used for the Closing
analysis for the period 30 May 2000 - 31 December 2000. Market capitalization is in
Sterling million. Panel A reports market capitalization on 1 June 1998 while in Panel B
capitalization is reported on 31 December 1999. For each quintile, we report the mean
and median capitalization. Price is the mean cross-sectional average price, in pence, for
each quintile. In Panel A, Volume is the mean daily Sterling-Volume for each security;
First Trade is the mean Sterling-Volume of the first trade for each day. Panel B reports
the mean daily Sterling-Volume (Volume) for each security in the FTSE 250 index and
the mean Sterling-Volume of the last trade (Last Trade).
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Table 2: Opening and Closing Procedures on the London Stock Exchange 
  
  Panel A: Opening of Market 
 
 Panel B: Closing of Market 
Market 
Cap 
 No Open Call Only Dealer 
Only 
Both 
Systems 
 No Close Call 
Only 
Dealer 
Only 
Both 
Systems 
           
Highest  7142 
[10.15%] 
2938 
[4.17%] 
3832 
[5.45%] 
375 
[0.53%]  
179 
[0.78%] 
230 
[1.00%] 
167 
[0.73%] 
4036 
[17.60%] 
2  7232 
[10.28%] 
2034 
[2.89%] 
4573 
[6.50%] 
228 
[0.32%]  
223 
[0.97%] 
423 
[1.80%] 
325 
[1.42%] 
3613 
[15.75%] 
3  7210 
[10.25%] 
1518 
[2.16%] 
4892 
[6.95%] 
178 
[0.25%]  
368 
[1.60%] 
504 
[2.20%] 
765 
[3.34%] 
2854 
[12.44%] 
4  7392 
[10.50%] 
1410 
[2.00%] 
5211 
[7.41%] 
76 
[0.11%]  
517 
[2.25%] 
92 
[0.40%] 
1885 
[8.22%] 
2168 
[9.45%] 
Lowest  7611 
[10.81%] 
1059 
[1.50%] 
5400 
[7.67%] 
72 
[0.10%]  
667 
[2.91%] 
46 
[0.20%] 
2433 
[10.61] 
1444 
[6.30%] 
           
 
The table reports the number of firm-days for each type of opening and closing procedure for the FTSE 100 stocks officially assigned 
to the order book system (SETS) on 1 June 1998. In Panel A we report statistics for the opening procedures. In Panel B we report 
statistics for the closing procedures. In parentheses we report the % of firm-days for (i) each type of open for the period 1 June 1998 to 
31 December 2000 in Panel A, and (ii) for each type of close for the period 30 May 2000 – 31 December 2000 in Panel B. The column 
“No Open” (“No Close”) reports the number of firm-days where there were no trades at the open (close) neither through the Call nor 
through the Dealership Market; the column “Call Only” reports the number of firm-days when there was trading exclusively on the 
Open (Close) Call; the column “Dealer Only” reports the number of firm-days when there was trading exclusively on the Dealership 
Market; and the “Both” column reports the number of firm-days when there was trading on both the Open (Close) Call and Dealership 
Market. 
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Table 3: Mean Absolute Differences in Call and Dealership Markets 
  
  Panel A: Opening of 
Market 
 Panel B: Closing of Market 
      Benchmark Price I  Benchmark Price II 
Market 
Cap 
 Call Dealers t-stat  Call Dealers t-stat  Call Dealers t-stat 
             
Highest  0.759 1.281 8.55*  0.233 0.303 4.28*  0.657 1.130 6.42* 
2  1.014 1.315 7.81*  0.251 0.296 2.29*  0.863 1.148 5.04* 
3  1.301 1.489 7.29*  0.376 0.398 1.76  1.070 1.325 4.53* 
4  1.436 1.615 7.02*  0.371 0.328 1.21  1.397 1.418 1.82 
5  2.025 2.304 6.84*  0.382 0.459 3.14*  1.723 2.044 3.84* 
6  2.257 2.618 6.47*  0.456 0.554 4.49*  1.987 2.306 3.48* 
7  2.881 3.042 5.17*  0.504 0.635 6.14*  2.287 2.613 2.65* 
8  3.141 3.181 1.55  0.558 0.709 5.80*  2.595 2.946 2.68* 
9  3.755 3.416 2.11  0.669 0.689 1.61  2.913 3.219 2.19* 
Lowest  3.921 3.854 1.48  0.856 0.833 1.04  3.195 3.302 1.25 
             
 
The table reports the Mean Absolute Difference (in %) of prices generated by the Call Market and the Dealership 
Market from benchmark prices. Panel A reports the Mean Absolute Differences of open prices of the Call and 
Dealership markets from the volume-weighted average price of all trades executed on the London Stock Exchange 
between 8:45 a.m. and 9:15 a.m. Panel B reports the Mean Absolute Difference between the close prices of the Call and 
Dealership Market from two different benchmark prices. Benchmark Price I is the volume-weighted price of all trades 
executed on the dealership system between 4:37 p.m. and 4:45 p.m. Benchmark Price II is the volume-weighted price 
obtained from all the firm orders submitted to the subsequent opening call and all trades on the dealership system on 
the following day between 7:50 a.m. and 7:59:59 a.m. The period under consideration is 30 May 2000 – 31 December 
2000. The t-statistics of the differences between the Call’s and Dealership’s Mean Absolute Differences are also 
reproduced. An * indicates that the mean difference is smaller on the Call and is significant at the 5% confidence level.  
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Table 4: Weighted Price Contribution on the Call and Dealership Markets 
  
  Panel A: Call Market  Panel A: Dealership Market 
 
Market 
Cap 
 7:50 am – 
7:55 am 
7:56 am – 
call end 
8:00:30 am 
– 4:30 pm 
4:30:01 pm 
– 4:37 pm 
4:38 pm – 
7:50 am 
 7:50 am – 
7:55 am 
7:56 am –  
call end 
8:00:30 am 
– 4:30 pm 
4:30:01 pm 
– 4:37 pm 
4:38 pm – 
7:50 am 
             
Highest  0.009 0.116*A 0.675* 0.200* A 0 0.006 0.097* 0.713* 0.181* 0.003 
2  0.009 0.101* A 0.718* 0.172* A 0 0.006 0.065* 0.804* 0.121* 0.004 
3  0.008 0.084* 0.734* 0.174* 0 0.007 0.086* 0.724* 0.179* 0.004 
4  0.010 0.097* A 0.708* 0.185* A 0 0.008 0.075* 0.751* 0.162* 0.004 
5  0.006 0.071* 0.777* 0.146* 0 0.006 0.076* 0.764* 0.149* 0.005 
6  0.007 0.070* 0.773* 0.150* A 0 0.004 0.077* 0.789* 0.128* 0.002 
7  0.005 0.078* A 0.793* 0.124* 0 0.005 0.062* 0.774* 0.157* B 0.003 
8  0.008 0.046* 0.810* 0.136* A 0 0.005 0.064* B 0.824* 0.105* 0.002 
9  0.005 0.049* 0.801* 0.145* 0 0.005 0.061* B 0.782* 0.150* 0.003 
Lowest  0.007 0.039* 0.857* 0.097* 0 0.004 0.044* B 0.841* 0.109* B 0.002 
             
 
The table reports the weighted price contribution of various trading periods to the close-to-close return price change. Panel A shows 
the weighted price contribution on the order book while Panel A shows that for the dealership market. Both panels are for the FTSE 
100 stocks. The weighted price contribution is calculated across stocks for each day and then averaged across days. Days that have 
zero returns are removed from the sample. The period under consideration is 21 September 1999 - 31 December 2000. An * indicates 
that the value is significantly different than zero at the 5% level. An A (B) indicates that the Weighted Price Contribution of the Call 
(Dealership) is larger than that on the Dealership (Call) at the 5% level. 
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Table5: Stage II endogenous switching regression 
 
  Panel A:  
Open Period 
Panel B:  
Close Period 
 
Intercept  0.3118** 0.1951** 
β1 [Order imbalance]  1.7848** 0.5343* 
β2 [Price revision]  -0.9111 -0.4751 
β3 [Trader’s bid dispersion (x10,000)]  0.4237 0.0290 
β4 [Market’s bid dispersion (x10,000)]  0.0918 0.0187 
β5 [Volume (x100,000)]  -0.1061** -0.0055** 
β6 [Adverse selection costs]  0.0095** 0.0037* 
β7 [Variability]  0.7309* 0.5418* 
β8 [Order size (x10,000)]  0.6474** 0.1848** 
β9 [Number of orders]  -0.0264 -0.0027 
β10 [Φ]  0.6288** 0.4281** 
β11 [Φ * Order imbalance]  -1.2465* -0.8061 
β12 [Φ *  Price revision]  1.1290* 0.7552 
β13 [Φ *  Trader’s bid dispersion (x10,000)]  -1.2280 -0.0751 
β14 [Φ *  Market’s bid dispersion (x10,000)]  -0.1784 -0.0337 
β15 [Φ *  Volume (x100,000)]  0.1175* 0.0065* 
β16 [Φ *  Adverse selection costs]  -0.0169** -0.0064* 
β17 [Φ *  Variability]  -0.5426* -0.6521* 
β18 [Φ *  Order size (x10,000)]  -1.3083** -0.3397** 
β18 [Φ *  Number of orders]  0.0368 0.0035 
β20 [φ]  -0.2081** -0.1951** 
 
The table reports the coefficient estimates of the second stage endogenous switching regression model of 
trading costs on the Call Market and the Dealership Market. Order imbalance is measured as the share 
imbalance of firm buy orders less sell orders (in number of shares) weighted by the time they stay on the 
order book in the auction process. Price revision is measured as the absolute price revision that takes place 
from the start until the end of the auction. Trader’s bid dispersion (market’s bid dispersion) is measured as 
the standard deviation of the volume-weighted bids of the broker submitting each order to the call (bid 
dispersion of all traders submitting orders to the Call Market). Volume is the normalized dollar-volume in 
the (a) first hour of continuous trading for the Open Call, and (b) in the last hour of continuous trading for 
the Closing Call. Variability is the normalized standard deviation of returns in the first (last) half hour of 
continuous trading for the open (close) period. Adverse selection costs are calculated using the Lin et al. 
(1995) methodology using effective spreads in the first (last) half hour of continuous trading for the open 
(close) period. Order size is the size, in number of shares, of each order submitted to the Call Market and 
the trade size executed on the Dealership Market. Number of orders is the number of orders submitted to 
the auction. Panel A shows the results for the open period and Panel B shows the results for the close 
period. An ** (*) indicates that the mean difference is smaller on the Call and is significant at the 5% 
(10%) confidence level. 
